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by David Collins∗ 
ABSTRACT: 
Article XXb of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement prohibit health safety measures which are 
unreasonable restrictions on trade, which WTO case law has shown to mean not based 
upon sound scientific principles or international consensus.  However the existing 
difficulty in ensuring uniformity in these criteria as implemented by the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) necessitates resort to a universal scale for assessing the 
legitimacy of health and safety precautions by reference to an objective cost benefit 
analysis.  This paper attempts to apply the J-Value scale, developed in the United 
Kingdom to gauge expenditures in industrial risk prevention, to evaluate the 
reasonableness of WTO member state product safety regulations in a readily 
quantifiable, judicially instructive manner.  The J-Value can be implemented by WTO 
panels ex post as well as government regulators ex ante in order to assess whether or 
not a specific measure aimed at ensuring human health and safety is actually an 
unnecessary barrier to international trade.  In keeping with WTO principles, key 
features of the J-Value formula allow for different tolerances towards health risks 
depending on the view of the Member states which implement them, based on factors 
such as life expectancy and Gross Domestic Product (GDP).   
 
I   Introduction 
There is now a substantial body of commentary on the important fields of health 
regulation at the World Trade Organization (‘WTO’), primarily in relation to the 
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Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (‘SPS Agreement’) which has 
called for improved methodology with respect to the Dispute Settlement Body’s 
(‘DSB’) ambiguous and largely unworkable approach to the risk regulation by 
Member States.  In the words of two commentators: “the WTO lacks a consistent, 
principled manner in which to take account the scientific uncertainty underlying 
[environmental] policy objectives.”1  The SPS Agreement specifically has been 
criticized for invoking standards which are so loose that it is essentially unworkable.2  
This has led to requests for “an explicit, principled basis ... to provide consistency and 
predictability”3 in the review of domestic risk assessment strategies.  While much of 
the scholarly debate on these issues is invaluable and some of it referenced herein, 
there has been no attempt by any WTO scholars to substitute an enhanced mechanism 
for gauging the reasonableness of regulatory risk assessment that could be 
implemented either by Member state governments ex ante or by the DSB ex post in 
establishing conformity or lack thereof with WTO obligations concerning health 
measures.  This article provides the most substantive, practical means of reform to the 
WTO’s regulation of health protection by adapting an established mathematical 
formula, the J-Value, which has already been used to assess the reasonableness of 
expenditure in health / safety precautions in industry, to the text of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (‘GATT’) General Exceptions as well as the SPS 
Agreement.  Drawing upon the implicit connection between efficiency (as derived 
through the formula’s simple yet sophisticated form of cost-benefit analysis) and 
reasonableness, the J-Value is presented as a highly useful standard for determining 
the legitimacy of health measures in terms of social welfare which have deleterious 
                                                
1
 Andrew Green and Tracey Epps, “The WTO, Science and the Environment:  Moving Towards 
Consistency” 10 JIEL 285 at 286 
2
 Joanne Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures:  A Commentary (OUP, 
2007) at 44. 
3
 Ilona Cheyne, “Risk and Precaution in World Trade Organization Law” 40(5) JWT 837 at 864. 
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effects on international trade.  Because the formula draws upon the scientific evidence 
that is offered by each Member state and acknowledges regional differences in quality 
of life it is responsive to regulatory sovereignty while fostering international 
consensus in the levels of health protection that should be pursued. An improved 
methodology for evaluating the reasonableness of health safety measures may not 
only be beneficial at the level of WTO dispute settlement but we should expect that 
augmented procedural requirements necessary to conform to the J-Value standard 
may also have a positive effect on administrative decisions at the domestic level that 
do not have an effect on international trade, including greater transparency and 
accountability.4 
 This article will begin by contextualizing the J-Value formula for health 
expenditure within the existing commentary on cost-benefit analysis as a tool of legal 
reasoning.  The current legal regime for the regulation of health protection measures 
at the WTO - the General Exceptions under Article XX b) and the SPS Agreement 
will be briefly outlined with reference to some of the case law in this area in Part 
Two.  Part Three will explain in a systemic fashion precisely how the J-Value works, 
describing how each of its variables is derived as well as some of the associated 
difficulties in quantifying various values.  Part Four will expand upon the relevance of 
the J-Value to the sphere of international trade, concluding with a hypothetical 
example of a trade measure and its associated effects upon health in order to 
substantiate the functionality of the formula through actual numeric values.  The 
importance of the J-Value will be emphasized in Part Four which evaluates the need 
for efficiency in the administrative regulation of health concerns by reference to the 
specific WTO provisions for which it offers guidance.  The conclusion will highlight 
                                                
4
 Green and Epps “The WTO, Science” at 287. 
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the usefulness of the formula while acknowledging certain drawbacks, namely the 
uncertain linkage between economic cost and human safety.   The application of the J-
Value formula to the WTO’s Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (‘TBT 
Agreement’) will not be covered by this article as this instrument deals with product 
standards of a more general nature and does not encompass human health measures 
directly, which the J-Value was purposely designed to address.  
 
 
II   Health and Safety Measures at the WTO 
i) GATT XX b) Exception for the Protection of Human Life and Health 
The GATT provides some room for Member states to promote other policies in 
conjunction with their WTO obligation to liberalize trade.  One of the primary 
instruments for this vital aspect of states’ sovereignty is the set of General Exceptions 
contained in Article XX.  For our purposes, the most important component of this 
article is subsection b) which permits measures which are “necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health”.  The ability of a Member state to pursue a 
policy with this objective in mind is restrained by the chapeau to Article XX which 
requires that such a measure not be “applied in a manner which would constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries ... or [be] a 
disguised restriction on international trade”.   
 Although the text of the article itself does not make reference to science, case 
law has shown that measures which are purportedly justified under XX b) as 
“necessary” should be founded upon scientific evidence. However, there is very 
limited guidance as to what will suffice as scientific evidence regarding the existence 
of a risk to health.  The Appellate Body concluded in EC - Asbestos that a Member 
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may rely on scientific sources which diverge from qualified and respected opinion.5  
The risk to human health which the measure is intended to address need not be 
quantified but may be evaluated in qualitative terms6.  In US-Shrimp the Appellate 
Body further ruled that the nation imposing an environmental measure must make a 
good faith effort to engage in negotiations with other nations, which demonstrates the 
dispute settlement body’s primary focus on procedural requirements rather than 
substantive, evidentiary ones, such as the quality of the science informing the 
regulation in question.7 
 To date the Article XX b) exception has been invoked in three highly 
controversial WTO cases: US- Gasoline8 (wherein a US law that required certain 
gasoline to burn cleaner was not permitted by the panel); EC-Asbestos9 (wherein a 
French law prohibiting asbestos products was upheld by the Appellate Body as 
necessary to protect human health); and EC- Tariff Preferences (wherein tariff 
preferences granted by the EC to countries experiencing drug trafficking problems 
were held not to fall within the scope of the XX b) exception following a modification 
by the Appellate Body).10 A number of Lesser Developed Countries (‘LDCs’) have 
argued that Article XX has been abused by nations such as the United States as a 
means of disguised protectionism through the requirement of unjustifiably high 
standards which are difficult for exporters in impoverished nations to fulfil because of 
inferior resources.  The sharing of technical expertise with respect to health risk 
identification and management, as an important component of international 
harmonization of standards, could help address this concern. 
                                                
5
 EC Asbestos [178] 
6
 Asbestos [167] 
7
 Green and Epps “The WTO, Science...” at 299 
8
 US - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline WT/DS2/AB/R  
9
 EC - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R 
10
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 The functionality of the GATT Article XX b) exception and the article’s 
chapeau, which was designed to prevent abuse of the exceptions for protectionist 
measures, rests upon the ambiguity of the concepts of arbitrary and unjustifiable, 
which in turn hinge on the veracity of scientific evidence.  It will be suggested below 
that an objective, numerically quantifiable formula such as the J-Value can be used to 
facilitate the interpretation of these important qualifying terms.   
 
ii) Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (‘SPS 
Agreement’)  
The SPS Agreement is narrower in scope than GATT Article XX covering only 
measures that are related to human, animal and plant life or health.  In that sense the 
SPS Agreement is in many ways an extension of the GATT XX b) exception. 
However, the SPS’s application is not contingent on a prior breach of the GATT. 
Article 2.4 of the SPS states that sanitary or phytosanitary measures which conform to 
the SPS Agreement shall be presumed to be in accordance with the obligations of 
Members under the GATT Article XX b).  There have been five WTO disputes in 
which the SPS Agreement has been interpreted, Australia - Salmon11, Japan - 
Agricultural Products II12, Japan-Apples13 and EC- Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products14 and EC-Hormones.15 In all of these cases the Member imposing 
the SPS measure was determined to have violated some aspect of their SPS 
Agreement obligations.  While the agreement itself is relatively narrow in scope, 
recent WTO jurisprudence has shown that the SPS may have a wide-ranging 
application including measures aimed at addressing risks that may arise indirectly or 
                                                
11
 Australia -  Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon - AB Report WT/DS18/AB/R 
12
 Japan - Measures Affecting Agricultural Products II,  WT/DS76/AB/R 
13
 Japan - Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, WT/DS245/AB/R 
14
 EC - Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, panel report WT/DS291/R 
15
 EC-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products - AB Report WT/DSD26/AB/R 
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in the long term.16 Annex A of the SPS Agreement establishes that sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures involve those which are aimed at protecting human, animal or 
plant life from disease, contaminants, toxins and pests.  Only measures which have 
one of these purposes will be subject to scrutiny under the SPS Agreement.  Article 
2.2 requires that SPS measures are applied only to the extent necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health, a restriction which is very similar to GATT 
Article XX b), except that unlike Article XX b) which operates as a defence, Article 
2.2 of the SPS is a general obligation that applies to all SPS-related measures.  For the 
purposes of the J-Value which is the focus of this article, only those measures which 
affect human health will be considered herein.   
 Article 2.2 importantly provides that the measures must be based upon 
“scientific principles”.  This requirement has been a source of significant controversy 
in large part because of the perceived fallibility of science as a means of 
understanding and controlling risk.  Mindful of this concern, the Appellate Body in 
EC Hormones insisted upon the right of Member states to determine the level of 
protection which they feel is appropriate.  The Appellate Body affirmed that Members 
have an autonomous right to determine the appropriate level of SPS protection in 
Japan- Varietals17.  While there is no indication that the dispute settlement bodies will 
second-guess a stated level of protection, the means to achieve it will rightly be the 
subject of scrutiny under the agreement and measures which are viewed as 
disproportionate in terms of their trade-related effects will be disallowed.  Still, the 
SPS’s devotion to science has been derided because for its ignorance of both the 
cultural component of risk (that certain groups are more willing to tolerate certain 
                                                
16
 Panel EC Biotech par 7.226, see Jacqueline Peel, “A GMO By Any Other Name...Might Be an SPS 
Risk: Implications of Expanding the Scope of the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
Agreement” 17 EJIL 1009 (2006) 
17
 at [194]. 
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types of risks than others) as well as the significance of irrational fears in people’s 
lives which are not necessarily demonstrated by statistical evidence.18  Such concerns 
are within the realm of popular opinion, which is typically irrelevant to the question 
of scientific validity but which some scholars hold to be an essential component in 
regulatory risk assessment.19 This latter view has led to what Fisher has described as 
the SPS’s clash between democracy and science - that the will of the electorate and 
their personal concerns about various health risks should inform regulatory measures, 
not laboratory testing20.   We will return to this debate in Section VI. 
 Related to the requirement of scientific justification through risk assessment, 
Article 3.1 outlines that Members shall base their sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
on international standards and guidelines in an attempt to promote harmonization of 
health standards worldwide through the adoption of the same or similar policies of 
health protection.   Three standard setting bodies are specified, only one of which has 
direct relevance to human health:   The Codex Alimentarius Commission for food 
safety21.  Motaal has criticized the authority granted to these agencies because of the 
highly politicized decision-making processes that occur both within these bodies and 
at the WTO which undermines the credibility of these bodies as truly embodying 
multilateral scientific consensus,22 again suggesting that a more objective standard is 
required.  Although the Appellate Body has been reluctant to acknowledge the 
                                                
18
 See e.g. Joanne Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures:  A 
Commentary (OUP, 2007) at 77-79, 150-151; Elizabeth Fisher, “Risk and Environmental Law: A 
Beginner’s Guide” in Benjamin Richardson and Stepan Wood eds. Environmental Law for 
Sustainability (Hart 2006) at 99. 
19
 Caroline E Foster, “Public Opinion and the Interpretation of the World Trade Organization’s 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures” 11 JIEL 427; Tracey Epps, “Reconciling Public 
Opinion and WTO Rules Under the SPS Agreement” 7(2) World Trade Review 359 (2008). 
20
 Elizabeth Fisher, “Beyond the Science/Democracy Dichotomy:  The WTO Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Agreement and Administrative Constitutionalism” in Christina Joerger and Ernst-Ulrich 
Petersmann eds. Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and Social Regulation (Hart, 2006).  . 
21
 The other two are the World Organization for Animal Health and Epizootics (OIE) and the 
Secretariat of the International Plant Protection Convention.  Either could conceivably affect human 
health indirectly.  See Annex A par 3(a),(b) and (c) of the SPS Agreement. 
22
 Doaa Abdel Motaal, “’The Multilateral Scientific Consensus’ and the World Trade Organization” 
38(5) JWT 855 at 864-866. 
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dominion of these listed agencies23, under 3.2 of the SPS if such international 
standards are adhered to, then a health protection measure is presumptively valid 
under the SPS and the GATT.   If not then it is up to the Member state to justify the 
measure under Article 3.3.  Scott is critical of the SPS’s emphasis on standardization 
which she depicts as “a methodological straightjacket operating in the name of false 
universalism and a naive conviction of there being right answers”24.  While 
standardization may well promulgate false beliefs and erroneous science there is an 
undeniable economic justification, namely efficiency gains resulting from power 
sharing over a particular element of jurisdiction25.  Member states which cannot 
afford to conduct expensive risk assessment may implement the standards derived 
from studies conducted by their wealthier trading partners.  For the purposes of this 
article, the primary concern with international standard setting bodies, such as those 
listed in the SPS Agreement, is that they may set levels of health protection which are 
economically unwise, meaning that from a perspective of social welfare the resulting 
gains are less than the costs imposed. 
 Article 3.3 establishes that Members may implement SPS measures which 
result in a higher level of protection than that indicated by international standards, if 
there is some scientific basis.  Perhaps most contentious of the provisions is Article 
5.7 which condones the adoption of provisional measures on the basis of limited 
available data where insufficient information to be certain of the risks involved.  The 
Appellate Body has stated that this section embodies the now notorious Precautionary 
Principle which establishes that a lack of reliable information on a certain risk 
justifies some level of regulation even if there is no evidence whatsoever of harm. 
                                                
23
 Joanne Scott, “International Trade and Environmental Governance: Relating Rules (and Standards) 
in the EU and the WTO” 15 EJIL 307 (2004) at 310. 
24
 Scott, The WTO Agreement on SPS, at 80 
25
 Joel Trachtman, “Regulatory Jurisdiction and the WTO” 10 JIEL 631 at 648 
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However, the Appellate Body also cautioned that the Precautionary Principle could 
not override the provisions of the SPS and it intentionally avoided rendering a 
definitive judgment on the status of the Precautionary Principle in international law.26 
Scott and Motaal feel that this is an injunction against Member’s hiding behind a 
mask of responsiveness to the unsubstantiated fears of a particular country.27  Foster 
holds that Articles 5.5 and 5.6 which prohibit arbitrary or unjustifiable levels of 
protection permit Member states to take into consideration the public’s views in the 
appreciation of the magnitude of risk as a means of fulfilling the basic principles of 
democracy as well as international human rights law.28 The relevance of the cost of 
the precautions is expressly contemplated in Article 5.3 which establishes that in the 
conducting of risk assessment for the purposes of setting a particular sanitary or 
phytosanitary regulation, Members shall take into account economic factors 
including: “the potential damage in terms of loss of production or sales in the event of 
the entry, establishment or spread of a pest or disease; the cost of control or 
eradication in the territory of the importing Member; and the relative cost-
effectiveness of alternative approaches to limiting risks”.   This sentence appears to 
embody an implicit calculus of the value of human life in economic terms of lost 
productivity due to illness or death. 
 Article 12.1 of the SPS establishes the Committee on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (‘SPS Committee’) which is a forum for consultations 
between Member states regarding compliance with the SPS.  The Committee also 
encourages the use of international standards by maintaining close contact with 
                                                
26
 Hormones [123].   The Precautionary Principle was advocated again by the EU in EC-Biotech but its 
application was rejected by the Appellate Body because not all parties to the dispute had signed the 
Cartagena Protocol on biosafety which made reference to the Precautionary Principle.European 
Communities — Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products (2006), WTO 
Doc. WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (Panel Report) at para 7.75 
27
 Scott at 151, Motaal, “Is The World Trade Organization Anti-Precaution?” 39(3) JWT 483 at 500 
28
 Foster, JIEL.   
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international standard-setting associations29.  The Committee must additionally 
undertake periodic reviews of the operation and implementation of the SPS30.  The 
importance of the SPS Committee in the development of good practice in risk 
regulation and norm generation through an evaluation of standards produced by 
international organizations should not be understated.31 Methods for assessing the 
reasonableness of regulatory precaution should be of significant interest to this body. 
 
III   Reasonableness of Precautions and the J-Value Scale 
i) Cost Benefit Analysis 
Law and Economics scholars have explored empirically based methods for resolving 
the ambiguity inherent in the common law’s ubiquitous reliance on the concept of 
reasonableness as a means of injecting greater coherence to the exercise of judicial 
discretion.  Posner notably suggested that the common law might be explained by 
reference to economic efficiency, meaning that benefits resulting from a certain legal 
rule were greater than costs.32 The use of strict cost-benefit analysis as a tool in 
assessing the reasonableness of a safety precaution was seen perhaps most famously 
in Judge Learned Hand’s equation from United States v Carroll Towing Co33 wherein 
he stated that an injurer will be negligent if the burden of the precaution against harm 
(B) is less or equal to than the resulting benefit, which is a product of the magnitude 
of the injury (I) multiplied by the likelihood of it occurring (P):  B ≤  IP.  Similar, less 
mathematically explicit methods of assessing the legitimacy of risk control have 
appeared in numerous pieces of legislation, case law as well as government feasibility 
                                                
29
 SPS Article 12.2-12.4 
30
 SPS Article 12.7 
31
 Scott Book, 47, 66 
32
 R.A Posner, ‘A Theory of Negligence’ 1 J of Legal Studies 28 (1972) 
33
 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) 
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studies, especially in relation to environmental hazards.34  Fisher writes that there is a 
widespread trend among governments of many advanced states to improve 
accountability in the administrative governance of risk control through verifiable, 
objective procedures and this requires analytic, formal methodology for managing 
facts regarding risk, such as some form of cost-benefit analysis.35  Sunstein has 
argued that cost-benefit analysis may be misleading because it creates an illusion of 
certainty whereas many attempts to quantify costs of injuries and benefits from 
prevention are deeply flawed.  Still, he urges that it is a useful source of information 
and can provide helpful guidance for agency decisions especially in light of the often 
irrational approach humans take towards evaluating risk36.  In contrast, Foster 
contends that risk assessment consists both of an objective and subjective element that 
undermines the functionality of formal cost-benefit analysis including in favour of 
individual sensitivities, such as, for example, the significance of death.37 Trebilcock 
and Soloway too have cautioned that cost-benefit type analysis should not attempt to 
make social and political judgments about what risks society should be prepared to 
assume.38  Generally cost-benefit analysis can be seen as a useful mechanism for 
assessing the social welfare engendered by a particular policy option especially if 
some room is accorded in the process for public participation.39  
                                                
34
 See Cass Sunstein, Risk and Reason:  Safety, Law and the Environment (Cambridge University 
Press, 2002) noting for example cost benefit analysis in the Safe Drinking Water Act 42 U.S.C. par 300 
and in Chemical Manufacturers Association v Environmental Protection Agency 217 F 3d 861 (DC Cir 
2000). 
35
 Elizabeth Fisher “Drowning by Numbers:  Standard Setting in Risk Regulation and the Pursuit of 
Accountable Public Administration” 20 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 109 (2000) at 127-128.   
36
 Sunstein, Risk and Reason at 35, 49, 105, 154. 
37
 Foster article JIEL at 439-440, referring to the International Law Commissions’ view of risk 
assessment which contains both objective and subjective elements: Article 2(a) Articles on Prevention 
of Harm from Transboundary Activities, 2001. Report of the International Law Commission on the 
work of its Fifty-third session, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth session, 
Supplement No 10 (A/56/10), Chapter V, available at 
<http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/prevention/preventionfra.htm>. 
38
 Trebilcock and Solway at 549 
39
 Fisher, “Drowning in Numbers” at 127 
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 Cost benefit type analysis as a tool of risk management is not new to the 
sphere of international trade and indeed as noted above it is reflected in Article 5.3 of 
the SPS Agreement, which requires that costs of precaution should be considered 
when assessing the legitimacy of a health protection measure.  It is noteworthy that 
the EC argued in its submission to the WTO Committee on Trade and the 
Environment that precautionary measures must be based upon a cost-benefit analysis 
of action and inaction40.  Trachtman has theorized that the WTO’s rules of negative 
integration, such as proportionality and least restrictive means under the SPS 
Agreement, can also be understood as techniques of maximization under cost-benefit 
analysis.  He writes that with some room for judicial discretion within the DSB, 
regulatory measures will accordingly be prohibited if they fail to pass a test of 
efficiency.41  Perhaps the most comprehensive application of cost-benefit type 
analysis to the WTO is that of Trebilcock and Soloway who argue that Members must 
be able to justify regulations that impact upon trade by demonstrating that they are 
based on plausible (not patently unreasonable) risk management, which will require 
some form of mandatory cost-benefit analysis.42  
 A more systemic, objective approach to the evaluation of domestic measures, 
such as those involving health, is required because the existing standard of review is 
currently dissapointingly opaque.  As outlined in Article 11 of WTO’s Dispute 
Settlement Understanding, the standard of review of domestic regulatory measures by 
a panel is neither total deference to the regulatory authority nor a de novo review but 
rather an “objective assessment of the facts”.  In the context of health measures, 
                                                
40
 WTO Committee on Trade & Environment, Communication from the European Communities on the 
Precautionary Principle WT/CTE/W/147 27 June 2001 at 14. 
41
 Trachtman “Regulatory Jurisdiction and the WTO” 10 JIEL 631 at 647-648 
42
 M Trebilcock and J Soloway, “International Trade Policy and Domestic Food Safety Regulation:  
The Case For Substantial Deference by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body under the SPS Agreement” 
in DLM Kennedy and JD Southwick eds. The Political Economy of International Trade Law (CUP, 
Camb, UK, 2002) at 551.  . 
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Button has criticized this standard as incoherent and unhelpful and has accordingly 
recommended a clearer “reasonable regulator” standard - would a reasonable 
government body have come to the same conclusion with respect to risk assessment.43  
Epps urges that the domestic risk assessment should be reasonable in the 
circumstances, which means neither arbitrary nor manifestly absurd.44 But not even 
these suggestions nor Trebilcock and Soloway’s reference to a “not patently 
unreasonable standard” are sufficiently clear as to offer genuine guidance for WTO 
panellists.  As we shall now see, the J-Value equation, which incorporates logical, 
flexible numeric values for variables risk, cost and gain offers an objective, practical 
standard for the review of health related measures while retaining sufficient deference 
to Member’s regulatory autonomy. 
 
ii)  The J-Value and Reasonable Spend 
Concerns regarding disproportionate spending on risk prevention by governmental 
authorities in the United Kingdom prompted professors Philip Thomas and David 
Stupples to develop a mathematical model that evaluates the extent to which monetary 
expenditure on risk prevention is reasonable or efficient from a cost-benefit 
perspective and as such can be viewed as a sensible regulation from a perspective of 
good governance.  The resulting Judgment or J-Value equation has been applied to 
safety precautions in the United Kingdom for road and rail transportation, the nuclear 
industry as well as offshore oil and gas.  It has notably revealed that various safety 
expenditures considered and implemented by the UK Department of Transport 
relating to rail accidents were wasteful by several orders of magnitude whereas some 
                                                
43
 Catherine Button, The Power to Protect:  Trade, Health & Understanding in the WTO (Hart, Oxford, 
2004) at 218-220. 
44
 Tracey Epps, “Reconciling Public Opinion and WTO Rules Under the SPS Agreement” 7(2) World 
Trade Review 359 (2008) at 379. 
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treatments implemented by the National Institute for Clinical Excellence to control 
diseases were very cost-effective.45  
 The J-Value relates exclusively to risks to human health and life, not to 
animals or plants and therefore it does not encompass the entire sphere of risks 
encapsulated in either GATT Article XX b) or the SPS.  The J-Value formula 
therefore could not have been implemented, for example, to ascertain the 
reasonableness of measures taken in the US-Shrimp dispute which concerned the 
health effects on animals.  In simple terms, the J-Value formula balances the 
monetary cost of a proposed safety measure against the maximum amount that the 
risk affected group should be prepared to spend, according to how much their lives 
should be worth to them in economic terms according to length of life and quality of 
life, which is related to available income and leisure time.  Thus the equation 
considers how much a person’s life is worth to them, not from the perspective of 
national benefit. This variable operates as a direct acknowledgement of the 
component of risk assessment that is tied to the socio-economic conditions in various 
societies, given that averages within a society can ever be considered truly 
representative of individuals within that society.  Any numeric result from the 
equation which is below 1.0 (indicating equality between actual and reasonable 
spend) is an efficient precaution. However a very low value should not be taken to 
indicate that more should be spent, but rather excellent value for money has been 
achieved.   Those greater than 1.0 demonstrate excessive, and therefore unreasonable 
spending, from which we might infer in a WTO context a motive of trade 
protectionism or else poor administrative governance, the latter of which may well 
beyond the purview of the WTO.   J = 1.0 will denote the maximally risk-averse 
                                                
45
 P.J. Thomas, D.W. Stupples and M.A. Alghaffar, “The Extent of Regulatory Consensus On Health 
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situation where the maximum reasonable sum is being spent on safety measures. A 
simplified explanation of the how equation is formulated follows.46 
 The first and perhaps most controversial stage in deriving the J-Value is to 
establish an appropriate measure for the quality of life.  Thomas and Stupples 
theorize47, that this can be quantified based on two factors:  1) how long an individual 
can expect to live from the present onwards and 2) how much money an individual 
will have available to spend, both on necessities and luxuries.  While at first blush this 
calculus may appear callous, the logic that one can enjoy their life more if they have 
more free time and more money to spend during that time is compelling.  However 
this theory recalls Foster’s suggestion that risk assessment necessitates a subjective 
evaluation of the way in which an affected person feels about death, which should in 
turn be related to how they feel about their lives.  Presumably death will be more 
ominous to someone the happier their life is - although this may also be dependent 
upon the extent of one’s religious convictions or views of the afterlife more so than 
quantifiable elements such as income and life expectancy.  Moreover, some 
individuals may prefer work to leisure and wealth could be viewed as a burden.  
These unresolved issues are beyond the scope of this article and may defy 
quantification in any meaningful way.48 Keeping to the quantity (length of life) and 
quality (income) criteria, a suitable measure for quality of life is therefore given by Q0 
where:  
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Q0 = Gq X 
 
Here X is the life expectancy of the average individual in years and G is the average 
annual earnings.  Superscript q is the “work-life balance” meaning the ratio of the 
average person’s time spent working to the time remaining (total life remaining minus 
working time).  In the United Kingdom, this ratio is taken to be roughly 1:7 (one’s 
remaining time alive is approximately seven times longer than the remaining amount 
of time one will spend working).  Of course this ratio should be different for 
developing nations where the work force is younger, life expectancy shorter and there 
is less time available for leisure, perhaps 1:4 or even 1:3, although in some LDCs 
there may be even more leisure time.  We see here that the flexibility of the J-Value in 
its accomodation of labour trends among different nations makes it a suitable process 
for deriving an international standard, although the precise level of protection chosen 
in each state may vary from state to state.  Similarly, average annual earnings which 
may be taken as the GDP per capita, and life expectancy and which can be taken from 
actuarial tables will vary from state to state.   
 The next aspect of the formula is to include a discount rate for life expectancy, 
which accounts for the reality that goods and services that an individual can use today 
are more valuable than those you must wait to have before you can enjoy them.  The 
specific discount rate used in cost-benefit analysis remains a very controversial issue, 
primarily because discount rates are inherently subjective.49Because of the sizable  
effect that a discount rate can have on the results of a cost-benefit analysis, many 
economists advocate the implementation of several discount rates and that the chosen 
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rate should be based on the time horizon of the policy in question - the longer the 
period over which costs and benefits accrue the lower the discount rate should be.50 
Thomas and Stupples argue that low discount rates are appropriate in the case of 
many health precautions because of the long period over which health effects such as 
cancer appear.  They suggest that a rate of 1-4% per annum should be used, although 
this may depend on the specific nature of the health risk addressed through the 
measure51.  The final version of the life-quality index, Q, is therefore given in terms of 
the discounted life expectancy, Xd in years: 
 
Q = Gq Xd   
 
 The change in life expectancy that is anticipated to result from a precaution 
that will enhance the safety of a group or a nation can be deduced to determine a 
maximum annual expenditure that government should be prepared to undertake.  This 
works under the following logic:  when a precautionary measure is taken, life 
expectancy should increase because of lower exposure to risk, but the yearly income 
available to the average person will decrease - the individual is giving up a portion of 
his income in order to pay for the expected extension of his life.  While the expense 
may actually born by the state (or another state as we shall see below) the benefits 
should still be based on the willingness to pay of the benefiting group.  This is 
consistent with the general principle of welfare economics that the benefits of a public 
program are measured most appropriately by the aggregate willingness to pay on the 
part of those benefiting from the program.  We can conclude that it is efficient or 
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reasonable to engage in a certain safety measure only if the new resulting life quality 
index is sufficiently higher than it was before the precaution was undertaken taking 
into account the decrease in quality of life associated with loss of income.  The 
change in life expectancy resulting from the enhanced safety precaution may be 
derived from physicians’ estimates or from calculations using actuarial tables.   As 
noted above the J-Value does not supply nor does it evaluate the credibility of the 
scientific data upon which probable life expectancy improvements are derived and as 
such it does not address the problem of scientific consensus mandated by the SPS 
Agreement.   
 The J-value is ultimately determined by dividing the actual or anticipated 
annual expenditure on precaution associated with the regulatory measure in money 
per year (a′ ) multiplied by the total population of affected individuals (pop) and 
therefore denoted as a′pop , by the maximum amount that the government should be 
prepared to spend (or as we shall see below, should be prepared to require a trading 
partner to spend) based on the increase in quality of life that it should engender in the 
affected group (denoted as a pop ).52   This is represented in the following simplified 
equation: 
 
J =  a′ pop  /   a pop 
 
Again, an acceptable safety scheme is one that is less than unity: a safety benefit 
results without a disproportionate use of financial resources.  The complete J-Value 
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equation can be re-written by breaking down these
 
variables into their constituent 
parts: 
 
 
J = q Xd a′  / (NG ∆Xd )  
 
where q is the work life balance ratio a′ is the annual expenditure per person per year 
in the exposed group, and  N is the number of people in the population exposed to and 
then saved from some threat.  Note that this is not the entire population of the 
Member state which imposes the measure and must be modified depending on the 
traded commodity in question.  For example, if the product is one that would only 
ever be used by a woman of childbearing age, such as a contraceptive device, then the 
population of males and females not of childbearing age must be excluded.  G is the 
average annual earnings of those individuals who are in the exposed group of size, N, 
which can be taken to be per capita GDP53. ∆Xd is the discounted change in life 
expectancy averaged over the group brought about by the safety scheme in question.   
 In summary, since the J-Value represents the ratio of the actual amount spent 
(or planned to be spent) to the maximum reasonable amount that should be spent 
given the expected (scientifically demonstrated) gains in life extension, we can 
conclude that a J-Value greater than 1.0 will cause a net disbenefit to society: more 
will have been spent than should have been.  If a J-Value of 2.0 results, then two-
times as much money is spent and the associated health-oriented prohibition could 
therefore be viewed as unreasonable.  Before this process can properly be applied to 
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interpretation of GATT XX b) and the SPS by the WTO panels the J-Value must be 
directly linked to trade effects. 
 
V   The J-Value and International Trade 
i)  Establishing the Figure for Annual Spend on Risk Prevention 
The obvious difficulty with adapting this formula to the sphere of international trade 
is the need to equate monetary expenditure in risk prevention (the a′ figure), which 
the formula was designed to evaluate, with the enacting of health protection 
legislation, which does not strictly speaking involve an outlay of money, other than 
the nominal administrative costs associated with the legislative process.  We must 
therefore ascertain a means of translating regulatory measures, such as a ban on a 
certain type of hormone in all imports of beef, into a quantifiable monetary value.   
 The most sensible way that this total safety expenditure could be calculated is 
to add up the total costs that would be incurred by the complainant nation in 
conforming to the health measure as required by the respondent state.  This approach 
is intuitively appealing because is consistent with the polluter-pays principle - those 
who create the risk of harm should bear the costs of protecting against it.  This also 
reflects the reality that that governments act to increase national welfare for the 
benefit of their citizens, even at the expense of other nations in the form of 
externalities.54  For example, where more stringent product testing is required on a 
certain good before it enters the importing nation, the question would therefore be:  
how much does it cost foreign producers to perform the mandatory testing?  These 
costs are properly termed externalities - they represent a cost associated with a 
particular regulatory action that is not born by the state enacting it but rather by some 
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other third party.  As noted above Members are expressly required to consider these 
costs under the SPS Article 5.3.  It is noteworthy that the Appellate Body observed in 
US Gasoline that the US did not adequately account for the cost to foreign exporters 
(gasoline refiners) from the measure, which was indicative of unjustifiable 
discrimination as prohibited by the chapeau of Article XX of GATT55.   We should 
expect that the cost of conformity with a health related measure as born by the 
exporting state might be notional rather than actual in the case of LDCs because of the 
impossibility of such state complying with the requirement due to lack of technical 
knowledge.  Note that a different figure for cost of precaution could result for each 
complainant country as the cost of conforming to a particular health regulation may 
be higher in absolute terms in one country than in another.  Relative costs, such as the 
relationship between the cost of conformity to the measure to the nation’s own GDP 
will be irrelevant as this could result in greater tolerance towards health risks from 
poorer countries.  This principle is explicitly included in some governments’ domestic 
guidelines with respect to health and safety precautions.56   
 In situations of an outright ban on a particular product because of health risk, 
such as in the EC-Asbestos dispute, the costs of conforming to the measure would be 
an inappropriate means of calculation because there would be no direct costs.  In such 
situations we might be tempted to use the volume of trade lost or other trade-related 
effects as a means of quantify the cost of precaution variable as a substitute for the 
direct costs of adhering to the regulation.  It should be noted that regulatory barriers 
typically cause significantly greater inefficiencies than other forms of protection such 
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as tariffs (which produce government revenue), quotas (quota rents are enjoyed by 
domestic importers or foreign producers who can raise prices) and subsidies (which 
increase consumer surplus in the relevant market).57 Still, even regulatory 
impediments should result in some advantage to domestic producers who are able to 
conform to the regulatory requirement at less expense than their foreign competitors.  
Any higher production costs associated with so doing could then be passed on to those 
consumers who are willing to pay higher prices.  Using a trade-effects approach to 
quantify cost of precaution is therefore problematic because according to Trachtman 
any losses suffered by foreign exporters who cannot adhere to stricter regulation and 
consequently must terminate trade of that good are typically fully accounted for in the 
advantages accorded to domestic producers, or on a worldwide scale, in the overall 
enhancement of trade in the affected product between other states.58 A figure could 
also be imputed for producers’ lost profits which have resulted from any decrease in 
sales because of these higher prices.  Moreover, there might additionally be 
unsatisfied demand among consumers in the importing state due to the impossibility 
of substitution of a prohibited good or an insufficient quantity of the good following 
the termination of export because of the mandated but prohibitively expensive 
precaution.  These inefficiencies associated with higher costs, unsatisfied consumer 
demand and decreased producer profits should be expected when an expenditure 
exceeding J-Value 1.0 is sanctioned as this will mean that safety has not been 
properly valued because those who benefit from the protection would themselves not 
value the resulting increase in life expectancy at this level.  Excessive spending on the 
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regulation of environmental risks is linked to deleterious effects on society such as 
increased prices, lower wages, unemployment and poverty.59  
 It should be noted that public choice theory suggests that regulatory health 
decisions could also have unquantifiable benefits for self-interested politicians as well 
as financial ones to the domestic producers which may not be in line with public 
interest.60  The J-Value does not attempt to embody such individualistic gains in its 
assessment of regulatory reasonableness. Indeed, its lack of recognition of them 
demonstrates that it is concerned with measurable advantages to society as a whole. 
 
ii) The J-Value in Practice:  A Hypothetical Example 
A hypothetical example of a health-related measure should illustrate how the J-Value 
would work in practice at the WTO.  Let us imagine that the government of Canada 
passes a regulation requiring that all peachnuts (which are an imaginary fruit 
consumed in Canada, 80% of which are imported) must be sprayed with a new 
chemical Bug-X before they enter the country in order to prevent the infestation on 
peachnuts of Dragon Worms. These microscopic organisms can cause severe 
intestinal infestations in consumers of peachnut products, which can lead to problems 
such as bowel cancer.  We will take the work - life balance ratio in Canada to be 1:7 
or 0.14 (similar to that of the United Kingdom).   Assuming that the peachnut-eating 
population has the same age distribution as the Canadian population as a whole then 
undiscounted life expectancy of the average peachnut eater will be 35 further years of 
life.61 For the sake of instructive simplicity here we will use a discount rate of 0%. In 
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this hypothetical example there are 100 thousand Canadians who consume peachnuts 
in sufficient quantities to be exposed to a significant risk of Dragon Worms, according 
to a reasonably plausible Canadian university study.  Recall that the J-Value does not 
inquire into the veracity of the scientific evidence and WTO panels will generally take 
a deferential approach towards the scientific evidence tendered by Members. The 
average annual earnings of these people (which we will take to be average earnings 
for all Canadians) is the per capita GDP of Canada which is approximately 48,000 
Canadian dollars per year in 2008.62  Research conducted by the same university has 
determined that using Bug-X spray on peachnuts will increase the life expectancy in 
the affected group by approximately 0.02 years per person (just over one week of 
extra life per person).  The annual cost of spraying imported peachnuts with Bug-X by 
the complainants in this matter, the Philippines, is the equivalent of CDN $5 million 
per year, resulting in an annual spend per affected person of 50 Canadian dollars.  
This means that in order to conform to the measure the Philippines government (or the 
private peachnut exporting firms in the Philippines) would have to be willing to spend 
50 Canadian dollars per Canadian consumer per year to eliminate the danger 
associated with Dragon Worms on peachnuts.  Put another way the Canadian 
government could be said to expect that the Philippines should be willing to incur this 
cost per affected Canadian per year should it wish to continue exporting peachnuts to 
Canada.  Displeased with this burden, the Philippines has requested the establishment 
of a panel regarding the illegitimacy of Canada’s Dragon Worm safety measure under 
the SPS, arguing that it is a violation of national treatment (a disguised attempt to 
favour the consumption of domestic fruits which do not carry Dragon Worms) and 
that it is not saved by GATT XX b).   
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 With values established for all of the variables we can now implement the J-
Value for a reasonable annual spend on this precautionary measure: 
 
J =     q      Xd        a′ 
 G             ∆Xd 
 
 
J =    0.14             35        50        
        48,000         0.02 
 
J =   (0.000002917) (1750) (50) 
 
J =  0.25  ≤  1.0 
 
Since the J-Value is less than 1.0 we can conclude that this regulatory measure 
enacted by the Canadian government is reasonable because it yields greater 
economically quantifiable gains than it costs.  In fact, the Bug X spraying scheme 
could be augmented and made much more expensive without creating a net disbenefit.  
The equation also tells us that, under the principles of welfare economics, each 
Canadian peachnut eater would be willing to pay $200 per year to extend their lives 
by one week, which seems intuitively plausible.63 Consequently it should be upheld 
by the WTO panel under both the SPS and GATT. 
 
VI   The J-Value and WTO Dispute Settlement 
With regards to dispute settlement itself, GATT jurisprudence has shown that the 
burden of proof in the implementation of an Article XX exception (both in relation to 
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the subsection and the chapeau) is on the party invoking it.64  The Appellate Body has 
shown that the first stage in invoking an exception is to ascertain whether the measure 
falls within one of the listed exceptions, such as b), then the next stage is to determine 
whether the justification satisfies the chapeau.65  Essentially, then, it is up to the 
Member state enacting the precautionary measure to show why it does so, or put 
another way that the burden of the precaution justified the expected benefit.  Unlike 
some of the other listed exceptions under Article XX, subsection b) requires that the 
measure be “necessary”, which suggests a higher standard than merely “related to” 
which applies to some of the other subsections.  The equally problematic issue of 
necessity as addressed by a number of Appellate Body rulings66, concerns the 
relationship between the measure and the desired goal.  The Appellate Body has 
clarified than the consideration of necessity begins with an assessment of the relative 
importance of the goals furthered by the challenged measure and this may be 
facilitated by the J-Value equation as it is based upon the expected gains in terms of 
quality of life, as a function of length and wealth.  If increases in quality of life (as 
determined by the Member’s own largely unquestioned research and testing) are 
insufficient given their associated costs, then this suggests that a measure is arbitrary 
and unjustified and therefore transgresses the chapeau.  Panels could infer that a 
measure yielding a J-Value greater than 1.0, as it is economically wasteful, has been 
pursued for a reason other than health protection and therefore may be violation of 
national treatment or most favoured nation obligations. 
 The adjectives “necessary” employed in Article XX b) may be judicially 
instructive for the precise interpretation of the J-Value as calculated: as a fairly strict 
standard, “necessary” might indicate some value even lower than 1.0 - meaning that 
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the health benefit must be greater than parity with cost in order for it to justify a trade 
distortion. “Necessary” as indicated under Article XX d) was taken by the Appellate 
Body to refer to a “range of degrees of necessity”67 so it may be assumed that this also 
applies to Article XX b)68.  Most agree that the necessity test has been applied more 
strictly under XX b) than under SPS (or the TBT Agreement).69  As such a lower J-
Value might be required to satisfy the XX b) exception than it would to qualify as a 
legitimate SPS measure.   
 One problematic feature of the J-Value is the requirement that country-specific 
data for the values of life expectancy and annual income (GDP) are used while certain 
health hazards may have international effects, such as the danger to a migratory 
species of sea turtle in the US-Shrimp dispute which dealt with GATT XX.  In these 
circumstances it would be necessary to average out the GDP and life expectancy 
across all peoples from all affected states - which could lead to a distorted picture of 
cost-efficiency for nations whose values for these variables fall on the extreme ends.  
Fortunately we should expect that there will be relatively few risks to human health 
that pose international threats such as the risk to oceanic turtles.   
 With respect to disputes brought under the SPS Agreement members are free 
to determine the level of health protection they desire for certain risks.  However, 
once chosen the measure enacted must bear a rational relationship to this goal as 
demonstrated by scientific principles.  That conformity with international standards 
may suffice in this regard is problematic because, as noted above, there is no 
indication that such standards are themselves objectively or rationally based.  More 
specifically, such standards may represent excessive expenditures of financial 
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resources and as such be unjustifiable.  In order for the measure to be viewed as 
legitimate from a trade perspective under the J-Value, the economic benefits (in terms 
of increased life expectancy in which income can be enjoyed) must exceed the costs 
of the implementing the precaution, both at the domestic level as well as born by the 
complainant exporting state which must bring its products into conformity with the 
measure at some expense.  The logic of the J-Value therefore is that even if there is a 
genuine risk, and even if it is one encapsulated in an international standard, the nation 
imposing the regulation cannot do so if the cost to its trading partner is too high 
relative to the gain, otherwise it will be an undue barrier to trade.   Consequently the 
J-Value is insensitive to irrational or politically motivated risks which do not result in 
tangible economic gains through increased quality of life. 
 There may, however, be some room for recognition of Member state’s 
idiosyncratic approach to various risks within the J-Value. The decisions in EC 
Hormones and Australia Salmon illustrate the importance of consistency among 
measures implemented by the same WTO Member.  In order for the challenged 
measure to be viewed as non-arbitrary or non-discriminatory similar levels of 
precaution should be maintained for similar risks.  The J-Value is instructive here 
because it establishes a means by which various health protection measures by one 
Member state can be measured against each other in terms of their value for money, 
even if they are irrationally based in an absolute sense.  Thus if a J-Value of 2.0 for 
one precautionary measure results, although it is therefore an excessive expenditure 
from a strict economic standpoint, a panel might conclude that it is legitimate if other 
precautions implemented by this Member state also have J-Values at this high level, 
which would suggest that although this nation may have an irrational willingness to 
spend on safety, because this approach is consistently applied it precludes a finding of 
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discriminatory intent behind a certain measure.  Of course this ignores the reality that 
certain groups may be (illogically) less willing to bear smaller risks for certain types 
of dangers than for others based on various emotive factors yielding unjustifiably 
different J-Values.70 A deferential standard of review of national levels of protection 
could be accorded generally by the Dispute Settlement Body by permitting, say, J-
Values of up to 1.5 even though they represent inefficient administrative decision-
making.  Such malleable interpretations of the J-Value could be bolstered in these 
circumstances through the submission of evidence regarding public sentiment 
regarding the risk in question.  It would be impossible to incorporate such data, 
involving for example, subjective impressions about dangers of certain chemicals 
used in food, into the equation itself.  Unfortunately broad discretion of this nature 
undermines the enlightening certainty of the equation as well as the potential for the J-
Value of 1.0 as an international standard to which all Members should adhere.   
 Fisher notes that the SPS Agreement is directly concerned with the 
reasonableness of administrative action as reflected in the extent to which an accepted 
risk is commensurate with enacted legislation.  She terms this administrative 
constitutionalism, or how public administration should be conducted and held to 
account.  Health regulation, she writes, should not be subject to a strict democratic 
standard, involving for example, extensive public participation, because it is 
conducted at the administrative level by delegated officials who may possess 
expertise in certain fields.71 Howse agrees, asserting that the SPS does not usurp 
legitimate democratic choices for stricter regulations but rather improves the quality 
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of rational deliberation about risk management.72 Esty has similarly argued that the 
WTO must endeavour to engage in good governance through carefully crafted 
administrative rules and procedures for decision-making based upon, inter alia, 
rationality, efficiency and clarity.73  Button too recommends a “reasonable regulator” 
standard of review of domestic measures because this method concentrates the panel’s 
mind on the fact that it is reviewing a regulatory action and not a disembodied set of 
facts.74  Finally Scott holds that reference to the appropriateness of standards in the 
SPS is indicative of the Appellate Body’s important role in the scrutiny of the 
standardization process - the route by which such organizations arrive upon the 
standards they promulgate.75  The J-Value is well suited to questions of this nature as 
it does not evaluate the credibility of the scientific evidence which informs the 
extension of life expectancy, but rather gauges the administrative logic underpinning 
the expenditure involved in addressing the danger as revealed by reference to 
economic cost.  Consequently we can conclude that a decision to invoke a certain 
standard of health protection will be WTO compliant if there was sufficient scientific 
investigation (process) which will be determined by reference to the relative costs and 
benefits of acting on the scientific evidence that the Member has obtained.76 The J-
Value is indicative of such legitimate process. We might further expect that panel and 
Appellate Body review of such essentially procedural requirements will be less prone 
to error than a review of the substantive content of a regulation with respect to its 
effect on health  (the extent to which a given precaution results in an observed 
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benefit), given the acknowledged fallibility of science.77  Furthermore, tighter 
procedural requirements embodied by the J-Value may reduce the incidence of 
protectionist measures being implemented for the selfish political motivations of 
politicians seeking to advance the interests of rent-seeking by certain domestic 
industries and which are not reflected in the J-Value calculus.78  
  As a prelude to the formal implementation of the J-Value during the dispute 
stage, the formula should be considered by the SPS Committee under its mandate to 
encourage the use of international standards by Members.  A standard could be 
conformity with an established process of regulatory assessment as well as a result, 
such as an acceptable level of a specific contaminant.  This should ensure that 
international standards, such as those set by the international standard setting bodies, 
are economically sensible.  Implementation of the J-Value would therefore be 
encouraged among all Member states as a prelude to regulatory action before the 
stage of dispute settlement.  This role for the J-Value would be less controversial than 
a mandatory test to be implemented by the DSB in relation to health measures or, 
even less likely, as a modification of the text of the SPS or GATT XX b). 
 
VII  Conclusion 
The J-Value represents a simple, useful standard for interpreting the reasonableness of 
a health precaution measure according to the resulting benefit, as approximated by 
increases in the duration and quality of life of those who are protected and as such it 
gauges the social welfare engendered by a particular measure.  More specifically, it 
can be adapted to the WTO arena to assist panellists in the determination of whether a 
health precaution is arbitrary or unjustified as outlined variously in the General 
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Exception for health and safety measures under GATT Article XX b) and the SPS 
Agreement.  The chief limitations of the J-Value are firstly that it is only suitable for 
an evaluation of measures which are aimed at protecting human health and as such 
cannot assist with some of the larger policy goals for the protection of animal and 
plant life encompassed by these legal instruments because it does not acknowledge 
these gains in terms of quality and duration of life.  Secondly, the J-Value does not 
clarify the what degree of scientific evidence can be viewed as sufficient for 
regulatory action, which is still an unresolved feature of Article XX b) and SPS 
related disputes which accord an indeterminate degree of deference to scientific 
findings as presented, especially if they are based upon international standards, which 
may themselves be unfounded.  The J-Value also suffers from the familiar argument 
that it is simply impossible to quantify the value of a human life or an extension 
thereto in pure economic terms without some institutionalized recognition of the 
subjective view of risk through formal public participation.  Finally and perhaps most 
problematically, even if we can accept that quality of life can be monetized, the logic 
underlying the J-Value is that a regulatory measure which affects trade should not be 
undertaken unless it makes economic sense to do so.  Economic efficiency is therefore 
taken as a signal of trade-barrier legitimacy and it is not clear that this is necessarily 
true.  Public choice theory tells us that a government may gain politically from 
imposing a measure even if there is an economic cost to society because certain 
measures may accord a benefit to certain politically powerful interests and this will 
not appear in the J-Value equation.  However such socially misaligned measures may 
be precisely the ones which the WTO dispute settlement system should be mindful of 
catching - although such an explicit objective might run afoul of concerns of state 
sovereignty. 
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 Still it is evident that the objective clarity and state-specific adaptability of the 
J-Value should warrant its consideration by WTO panels ex post (as well as by 
Member state governments ex ante) as a means of justifying a health safety measure 
that will have a deleterious effect on trade.  Furthermore, it may represent the most 
suitable form of an international standard for the purposes of conformity with SPS 
obligations and as such it could be a valuable tool in the hands of the SPS Committee.  
Further research into this innovative equation may reveal that it could also have an 
important role to play in other areas of law, notably in the judicial assessment of 
reasonable precautions and the standard of care in the private law of negligence, much 
as the Learned Hand formula originally envisioned.  
 
 
 
